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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
LARRY PASCOE, : Case No. 870269-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of 
vehicle homicide, a third degree felony following a jury trial held 
May 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1987, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 7, 1986, at about 11:45 p.m., Mr. Pascoe was 
involved in a two-vehicle collision on 12600 South in Salt Lake 
County (T. 118). Both vehicles were pickup trucks (T. 120, 133). 
The driver of the other pickup, Mr. Jeff Chandler, was killed at the 
scene (T. 337-338). No passengers were in either car (T. 134, 252, 
269). Mr. Pascoe was transported from the scene to a local hospital 
in an ambulance (T. 360). Following examination, a blood draw for 
use as evidence, and x-rays at the hospital, Mr. Pascoe was placed 
under arrest and transported to the Salt Lake County Jail (T. 44). 
At a pre-trial motion to suppress the blood alcohol 
result, the following facts were elicited regarding the blood draw. 
At the scene of the accident, Mr. Pascoe kept asking to leave but 
was told by a police officer he could not go (T. 26). Deputy 
Mitchell, who followed the ambulance to the hospital, had determined 
Mr. Pascoe was probably under the influence of alcohol (T. 37-38). 
Prior to the blood draw at the hospital/ the deputy informed 
Mr. Pascoe they were there to draw blood (T. 41/ 51). After 
Mr. Pascoe asked "why," the deputy responded he believed he had 
probable cause to suspect Mr. Pascoe of driving under the influence 
of alcohol (T. 41/ 52). Although Deputy Mitchell was aware 
Mr. Chandler had died/ he did not tell Mr. Pascoe he was being 
investigated for homicide (T. 47). Apparently/ Mr. Pascoe said 
"okay" and held his arm out. Ld. The blood was drawn at 12:51 a.m. 
(T. 42). The technician who drew the blood and who was present 
during the verbal exchange between Deputy Mitchell and Mr. Pascoe 
indicated that although Mr. Pascoe cooperated and knew he was going 
to have his blood drawn, the technician could not say that the 
cooperation was based upon informed consent (T. 49/ 59-60). 
Mr. Pascoe was told he was under arrest at 2:35 a.m. (jld.) and then 
transported to jail (T. 44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pascoe's lawyer was improperly denied opportunity to 
conduct voir dire. Additionally/ because of the erroneous admission 
of the results of Mr. Pascoe's blood alcohol results taken when he 
was not under arrest and without his actual consent and because of 
the trial court*s erroneous admission of cumulative and prejudicial 
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photographs, Mr. Pascoe was erroneously convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY RESTRICTING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S QUESTIONING OF PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS DURING VOIR DIRE, 
During the course of voir dire, defense counsel asked the 
Court to ask the prospective jurors "whether they have directly or 
indirectly worked with insurance agencies or claim adjustment or 
claim bureau[s] . . .."(Transcript of voir dire, at 28). The trial 
court refused to pose the question to the panel. Id. 
The scope of voir dire is a matter left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The trial court's rulings will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Maltby v. Cox 
Const. Co./ Inc.y 598 P.2d 336, 341 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 945 (1979). An abuse of discretion occurs when, "considering 
the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adeqaute opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate 
jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). One of 
the purposes of voir dire is to elicit sufficient information from 
jurors "to permit informed exercise of peremptory challenge[s]." 
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983). In State v. Ball, 
685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the Court found reversible error in the 
trial court's failure to allow questions regarding whether 
abstinence from alcohol was for a religious reason. The Court 
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indicated exploration of group memberships was important to discover 
actual bias or prejudice. Similarly, in Hornsby v. Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
87 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah App. 1988), this Court vacated a judgment 
and remanded the case for a new trial because of improperly limited 
voir dire. 
Utah's Supreme Court has likewise indicated, "discretion 
should be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
information from prospective jurors." State v. Worthen, 89 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah 1988). Both conscious and subconscious 
attitudes and biases need to be explored. JLd. at 24. In Worthen, 
the Court stated "[a]11 that is necessary for a voir dire question 
to be appropriate is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise his 
peremptory challenges more intelligently.'" Ij3. citing State v. 
Ball. The Court continued, "[peremptory challenges are designed to 
allow an opportunity to remove a juror, not because he or she is 
prejudiced as to the particular facts of the case but for more 
general biases that affect how a juror may perceive and evaluate 
witnesses, parties and evidence." Worthen at 24. The Court stated, 
"[v]oir dire should not be restricted to a 'stark little exercise' 
which discloses little." J[d. at 25. 
Defense counsel in the case at bar was attempting to 
explore potential biases by learning whether prospective jurors 
might know about how insurance companies handle these cases. That 
knowledge would have permitted defense counsel to explore potential 
biases or knowledge regarding defenses to insurance claims or 
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indications that these people might, as claims adjustors, have close 
working relationships with law enforcement agencies. Because 
defense counsel's voir dire was improperly limited, Mr. Pascoe's 
conviction ought to be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COORT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS 
THE RESULTS OF MR. PASCOE'S BLOOD TEST. 
At the pre-trial hearing on Mr. Pascoe's Motion to 
Suppress his blood alcohol results, the following facts were 
presented to the court. Mr. Pascoe was sent to the hospital in an 
ambulance but was not under arrest at the time. (T. M. to S.* 15, 
21, 26, 30). While at the hospital, a deputy informed Mr. Pascoe he 
was there to draw blood (T. M. to S. 40-41). When Mr. Pascoe asked 
the officer why he wanted blood from him, the officer testified he 
"advised him to the effect that we had reason to believe that he was 
under the influence of alcohol, and that we were drawing blood based 
on that probable cause." (T. M. to S. 41). Mr. Pascoe never was 
arrested for driving under the influence, but instead was eventually 
arrested for vehicle homicide (R. 3). The blood was drawn at 
12:51 a.m.; yet, Mr. Pascoe was not told he was under arrest until 
2:35 a.m. (T. M. to S. 42). He was not told prior to his giving the 
blood it would be used as evidence against him, nor was he told he 
was the subject of a homicide investigation (R. M. to S. 47). 
* Now and hereafter, transcript of this motion will be 
referred to as "T. M. to S." 
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Mr. Pascoe was not advised of his rights, informed of the nature of 
the blood test, or warned of the consequences of refusing to submit 
to the test before the sample was drawn (T. M. to S. 46-47). 
The laboratory technician who drew the sample remembered 
Mr. Pascoe had some question as to why the blood was being drawn 
(T. M. to S. 52). He further testified Mr. Pascoe had a 
conversation with the deputy outside the technician's presence 
before Mr. Pascoe held his arm out and said "okay." (T. M. to S. 
54-56). The technician never actually conversed with Mr. Pascoe 
(T. M. to S. 54). The technician testified "[Mr. Pascoe] knew he 
was going to have his blood drawn, and he consented to that. That's 
all I know." (T. M. to S. 60). The technician could not say that 
this was an informed consent (T. M. to S. 60). 
Because Mr. Pascoe's blood was neither drawn subsequent 
to his arrest nor with his consent, the trial court erred by failing 
to suppress it (T. M. to S. 78). 
A. MR. PASCOE WAS NOT UNDER ARREST AT THE TIME 
HIS BLOOD WAS DRAWN; THEREFORE, THE EVIDENCE 
DID NOT PALL WITHIN THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN 
ARREST EXCEPTION TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES. 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 
16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether the evidence of blood alcohol results should have been 
excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
In Schmerber, the officer had probable cause to arrest the 
petitioner, informed the petitioner he was under arrest, and advised 
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him regarding his right to remain silent, his right to an attorney, 
and, further, that anything he said would be used against him as 
evidence before the blood was drawn. JTd. at 768-69. The Court 
recognized the impractical nature of seeking a magistrate to issue a 
warrant prior to taking the sample because alcohol in the blood may 
diminish due to metabolism, jcd. at 771. The warrantless search was 
upheld as a valid search incident to Mr. Schmerber's arrest. This 
Court likewise has found requiring an accused to submit to a blood 
test following a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth or 
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. In re I,, R.L., 
739 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Pascoe was not placed under 
arrest until after his blood was drawn. Although Mr. Pascoe was 
told by officers at the scene he was not free to leave (T. M. to S. 
15), he was not told why he could not leave. He could reasonably 
have believed the officers were concerned he receive proper medical 
attention by going to the hospital and later, while at the hospital, 
by submitting to medical examinations and procedures. 
Similarly, while in the ambulance, Mr. Pascoe asked to 
leave and was told by Officer Peterson he could not (T. M. to S. 
26). At the Motion to Suppress hearing, Peterson testified he did 
not tell Mr. Pascoe he was under arrest, because he was alone in the 
ambulance with him and he feared for his safety. He testified he 
did not want to agitate Mr. Pascoe by telling him he was under 
arrest (T. M. to S. 26). While in the ambulance, Peterson told 
Mr. Pascoe, "[Ljet's worry more about getting you to the hospital 
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than worrying about all this other stuff right now." (T. M. to S. 
27). Once Mr. Pascoe arrived at the hospital, at least one other 
law enforcement officer was present, so the fear of a possible 
hostile response would have been diminimus at most; yet, Mr. Pascoe 
still was not told he was under arrest (T. M. to S. 32-33, 37-41). 
Utah's legislature has defined an arrest as the "actual 
restraint of the person arrested or submission to custody." Utah 
Code Ann. §77-7-1 (1982). The legislature also requires the person 
making the arrest to "inform the person being arrested of his 
intention, cause and authority to arrest him." Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-6 (1982). That statute allows for limited exceptions where 
notice might endanger the life or safety of others or where arrest 
during the attempt to commit the crime, actual commission of the 
crime, or flight after commission of the crime makes giving notice 
virtually impossible. 
Substantially similar statutes were interpreted in 
State v. Beckendorf, 10 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1932). In that case, police 
officers had a warrant for the search and seizure of liquor, 
apparently at the Beckendorf home. jrd. at 1074. The defendant came 
to the door but did not open it. Officers gained entry and found 
the defendant and her son in the bathroom destroying what they 
believed was liquor. J^ d. When Ms. Beckendorf attempted to prevent 
the officers from seizing a jug, one officer ordered another to 
"take her away." i^d. at 1075. When the officer took her by the 
wrist, she kicked him in the groin and he forcibly removed her to 
the kitchen despite her "kicking and hollering." JLd. The Court 
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stated, "there is no evidence that any officer ever informed or 
advised the defendant that she was under arrest or that her removal 
from the bathroom was intended as such." Id. The Court stated: 
We are unable to subscribe to the proposition that 
. . . the bare act of taking her into the kitchen 
constituted an arrest or an attempt to arrest. It 
appears rather that the officer had the intention 
only of removing her from the scene of the search 
and to prevent her interference. 
Id. at 1076. The Court stated, "[n]otice of arrest should be given, 
either expressly or by implication, and without such notice no 
amount of physical restraint can constitute an arrest.n icL The 
Court continued: 
The act relied upon as constituting an arrest must 
have been performed with the intent to effect an 
arrest and must have been so understood by the 
person sought to be arrested. A forcible seizure 
of one's person, without any pretense of taking 
him into legal custody, does not amount to an 
arrest. 
Id. (citations omitted). In reversing her conviction, the Court 
reasoned because the officers had opportunity to arrest 
Ms. Beckendorf but failed to advise her of an arrest, she could not 
be charged with resisting an arrest she could not know was being 
made. Id. 
The same rationale applies to the case at bar. Officers 
had ample opportunity to arrest Mr. Pascoe either at the scene of 
the crime or at the hospital. With the limited exception of the 
brief ambulance ride where only one officer was with Mr. Pascoe, no 
officers testified they believed notifying him of his arrest might 
endanger anybody. Deputy Mitchell testified he called for backup 
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assistance from the West Jordan City Police prior to arresting 
Mr. Pascoe, because a friend of Mr. Pascoe's had been at the scene 
and at the hospital "caus[ing] some commotion.• (T. M. to S. 43). 
Although the testimony regarding when backup officers arrived is 
unclear, it is unlikely they did not reach the hospital soon after 
Mr. Pascoe did. Deputy Mitchell also testified there were other 
officers at the scene of the accident (T. M. to S. 43), and he gave 
no indication of any situation which caused them to be unable to 
arrest Mr. Pascoe at the scene. 
Similarly, this was not a case of officers catching 
somebody during the commission of or flight after commission of a 
crime. The crime had already been committed by the time the 
officers arrived at the scene, and although Mr. Pascoe asked if he 
could leave, he made no attempt to flee from the scene or the 
hospital. Under the reasoning of State v. Beckendorf and the Utah 
statutes on arrest, Mr. Pascoe was not under arrest at the time of 
his blood draw. Therefore, unless this Court finds Mr. Pascoe 
consented to the seizure, the results of his blood draw should be 
suppressed. 
B. MR. PASCOE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE BECAUSE HE 
DID NOT CONSENT TO HAVING HIS BLOOD DRAWN. 
Utah's implied consent statute was recently interpreted 
by this Court in In re I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987). In 
that case, the defendant was similarly involved in a head-on 
collision. Two investigating police officers in In re I., R.L. 
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thought the defendant was probably driving under the influence of 
alcohol because of his speech, physical behavior and odor of 
alcohol. Icl. at 1124. As in the case at bar, the defendant was 
sent to the hospital in an ambulance but Was not placed under arrest 
at the time. _Id- A t the time blood was drawn from Mr. I. by a 
technician at the hospital, he, like Mr. Pascoe, had not been 
informed the purpose of the blood test was to determine his blood 
alcohol content.1 
In examining Utah's implied consent law, Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44.10(a) and (b) (1981), this Court found that although the 
"statute appears to legislatively create actual consent to a 
chemical test on behalf of any person operating a motor vehicle, it 
does not." I., R.L. at 1127. "[I]mplied consent by statute cannot 
supercede an otherwise constitutionally protected right." Id. 
relying on State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 1968), which found 
implied consent only controls once an accused is placed under 
arrest.2 
Drawing of blood from a suspect at the request of police 
for use as evidence is a warrantless search. Therefore, it can 
1
 In both Schmerber and I., R.L., the courts also 
examined the issue of whether the blood draw was made in conformity 
with accepted medical procedures. Mr. Pascoe does not contest the 
medical procedure employed in his case. 
2
 The statute analyzed in Cruz, using the language 
"arresting officer" has since been amended to include the words 
"peace officer" instead. Cruz at 308, I., R.L. at 1127 n.5. This 
Court found the new language did not violate the constitutional 
protections involved. I., R.L. at 1128. 
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be constitutionally upheld only if: 
(1) There is probable cause to believe the 
suspect was driving or in control of a motor 
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited 
blood alcohol content, 
(2) The suspect was arrested, and, 
(3) The method of extraction of blood was 
reasonable. 
I., R.L,, at 1128. This Court found because Mr. I. was not under 
arrest, the warrantless search was not constitutionally sound under 
Utah's implied consent statute. 
However, the right to be free from unconstitutional 
search and seizures can be waived if the accused gives actual 
consent. I., R.L., at 1126. This Court noted "Consent . . . is not 
to be lightly inferred, but should be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence. . . .*" j^ d., n.3 quoting from 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and 
Seizures, §46 (1973). This Court found that Mr. I. did not give 
actual consent because he offered resistance and was not informed 
the blood was being drawn to determine his blood alcohol content. 
I., R.L. at 1128. This Court found his blood test therefore should 
have been excluded. Id. 
Mr. Pascoe did not give actual consent to the blood 
draw. Although he did not resist the technician, he was never 
specifically informed the blood was being drawn to determine his 
blood alcohol content (T. M. to S. 41). He likewise was not told 
the blood was being collected to be used as evidence against him in 
a homicide investigation, nor was he told the consequences of 
refusing to have his blood drawn (T. M. to S. 47). Because 
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Mr. Pascoe was in the hospital and still under the care of the 
examining physician, he could easily have believed the blood was 
being drawn for medical purposes, when he held his arm out. Under 
the standards set forth by this Court in In re I., R.L., it cannot 
be deemed Mr. Pascoe gave actual consent to having his blood drawn 
for use as evidence against him. Therefore, the results of the 
blood test should have been suppressed, because they were drawn in 
violation of Mr. Pascoe's right to be free from unconstitutional 
searches and seizures. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING PREJUDICIAL AND CUMULATIVE PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Over Mr. Pascoe's objection, the trial court admitted 
exhibits numbers eleven and twelve, photographs of parts of the 
deceased's red truck which Mr. Chandler had been driving (T. 266, 
290). Trial counsel indicated either exhibit would be acceptable 
but not both (T. 266). Both of those exhibits portrayed in eleven 
by fourteen inch color photographs fenders or portions of the red 
truck which had been scattered by the impact. Skid marks on the 
pavement are essentially the same in both photographs. Road 
pavement markings are likewise essentially the same. Mr. Chandler's 
shoe which was found on the pavement is in view in both 
photographs. The angles from which both photographs were taken is 
also similar. 
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The trial court also admitted exhibits ten, fifteen and 
sixteen over Mr. Pascoe's objection (T. 266, 290). Again, trial 
counsel indicated one photograph would not be objectionable, but 
three were cumulative (T. 266). All three of these eleven by 
fourteen inch color photographs depict the red truck which 
Mr. Chandler was driving and Mr. Chandler's body covered by a white 
sheet. Exhibit number fifteen only shows a portion of the red 
truck. Exhibit number ten shows the truck in a more distant 
position than either of the other two exhibits but depicts the truck 
in its entirety. Exhibit number sixteen reveals a well-lit close-up 
view of both the truck and the body. All three exhibits reveal the 
passenger side of the truck and only exhibit number fifteen does not 
show the hood of the truck. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the 
exclusion of evidence even if it is relevant, if the "probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
• . . or by considerations of . . . needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." In State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court considered the admissibility of gruesome 
photographs and recognized the admission of such photographs is a 
matter left to the trial court's discretion. A trial court's 
decision to admit photographs will not be overturned absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 64. 
In State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968) (Poe I), such 
an abuse of discretion was found. The Court reversed Poe's 
conviction, because the photographs were admitted for the sole 
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purpose of "inflam[ing] and arous[ing] the jury." _I(3. at 515. 
Again in State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme 
Court found error (although deemed harmless) in the trial court's 
admission of photographs of a homicide victim, because the evidence 
was already before the jury and the evidence was not in dispute. 
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the photographs were "superfluous." 
Id. at 813. 
Again, in State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed a homicide conviction on the basis of 
the erroneous admission of prejudicial photographs. The Court noted 
the standard set forth in Garcia established the general principle 
that potentially prejudicial photographs are "generally 
inappropriate," unless their essential evidentiary value outweighs 
their prejudicial impact. In Cloud, the issues for which the 
photographs were admitted was conceded, so the photographs could not 
contribute essential evidentiary value. Jj3. at 753. 
In the case at bar, trial counsel conceded to the 
admission of any one photograph in each of the contested sets 
offered by the State but not to all of the photographs. The 
evidence was accurately depicted in either exhibit number eleven or 
twelve but became cumulative when both were admitted. Likewise, 
evidence portrayed in any of the exhibits numbered ten, fifteen or 
sixteen may have been probative but became cumulative when all three 
photographs were admitted. Numerous photographs of the same 
evidence carry no "essential evidentiary value" and should have been 
excluded. 
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The trial court not only erred in admitting the 
inflamatory evidence, the error was not harmless.3 where two large 
color photographs of truck parts and three large color photographs 
of the truck and the body were all admitted and published to the 
jury, undue emphasis was placed on this prejudicial display of 
gruesome facts. There was no dispute Mr. Chandler died at the scene 
and had been driving his truck at the time of impact. The force of 
the impact and position of the red truck was described to the jury 
through witnesses at the scene, and the prosecutor even used models 
of the cars over defense counsel's objection during his opening 
statement. (T. 96, 109, 111, 134, 202, 227, 241, 251, 252, 269, 
317-18, 323-24). Therefore, under the standards set forth in Utah 
Rules of Evidence 403 and the rationale of Cloud, Poe, Garcia and 
Wells, Mr. Pascoe's conviction ought to be reversed. 
3 A conviction will not be reversed unless the admission 
of evidence affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-30(a) (1982), Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the above-m0ntioned reasons, 
Mr. Pascoe asks this Court to reverse his conviction and to remand 
his case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -s, day of October, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that 
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which reasonable and 
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree 
which renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and 
causes the death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally 
negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means 
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as 
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alco-
hol content under this section. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of l^ lood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of 
violating this section. 
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in accordance with the Rules of Evi-
dence if administered on a defendant: 
(a) with his consent; or 
(b) without his consent after his arrest either under this section or 
under Section 41-6-44, when the officer has reason to believe that the 
victim may die. 
(7) (a) After a defendant is placed under arrest for a violation of this sec-
tion, the peace officer shall require that the defendant submit to a chemi-
cal test of his blood or urine. This test may be required without the 
consent of the defendant, as provided in Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The test required under this subsection does not prohibit the admin-
istration of other additional chemical tests under this section. 
(8) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled 
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any automobile, truck, van, motor-
cycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
